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1. Introduction 
OECD (2006, 2007) note that in most industrialized countries average health status has been 
improving, yet more and more people of working-age leave the workforce and rely on health-related 
income support. In Norway the number of disability insurance recipients per adult ages 25-64 went 
from 5.5 percent in 1967 to 8.2 percent in 1980 and 12.4 percent in 2004. In trying to stop or even 
reverse this trend, there has been much focus on changing the incentives faced by workers. Tightening 
the incentive structure seems appropriate if lax regulations and less stringent work norms have led to 
an increasing number of workers voluntarily leaving the workforce for disability. On the other hand, if 
it is increasing pressure on the workers which has been pushing workers with reduced work capacity 
out of the work force, then such tightening might not be that appropriate. In this case a minority of 
workers with reduced capacity are being squeezed out of the work force by demands for increased 
productivity, even while this increased productivity benefits the majority of workers delivering higher 
wages and, arguably, more interesting jobs. If access to disability benefit is reduced, workers 
experiencing difficulty in keeping up at work must find alternative work reflecting their productivity, 
but this can be difficult because of the presence of unions and other institutions and regulations 
influencing minimum wages. As an alternative they may be forced to seek unemployment or general 
social security benefits. 
 
The aim of this paper is to give an indication of the degree to which the increase in disability in 
Norway in the 90s is the result of firms pushing workers onto disability benefit. We consider a 
transition to disability as voluntary if the worker thinks her work is deemed satisfactory, but she 
experiences higher utility being disabled than working. A transition is considered involuntary if the 
feeling of not being able to deliver satisfactory work leads the worker to seek disability.  
 
Disentangling the desire of the workers to stay in their job from the desire of the firms to keep the 
workers employed is difficult. Any comprehensive indictors of these desires will necessarily be rough 
and based on strong assumptions. The central element in our paper is the prediction of the individuals' 
probability of wishing voluntarily to go to disability or rehabilitation. This prediction is based on 
McFadden’s (1973) discrete choice model and the use of the well-known independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property of the discrete choice model. From this prediction we can infer the 
probability of making such a transition involuntarily, and under certain assumptions, characterize the 
probabilities of firms wishing to get rid of a worker and the government accepting a person on social 
security.  
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We assume that the difference between the predicted probabilities of workers desiring social security 
and the observed transitions is due to the firms’ behavior and government implementation of the rules 
governing disability and rehabilitation. We develop two measures quantifying how many workers are 
involuntarily pushed onto social security by conditions at work. One is a simple residual, assuming 
that the difference between the observed probability of going onto social security and the predicted 
probability of workers wishing voluntarily to go to social security measures the number of workers 
being pushed involuntarily onto social security. The other is based on the use of a set of identifying 
assumptions to find the probability of the firms wishing for workers to enter social security and the 
probability that the government will accept workers onto social security. It entails a sequential 
estimation approach, with each step being conditional on the estimates of the preceding one. 
 
Our study focuses on married females working full time during the period 1992 to 1998, with separate 
analyses of each of the six age groups 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64. The number of 
married female workers making the transition to disability or rehabilitation is 24,004, giving us an 
average yearly transition rate from full-time employment to rehabilitation or disability of 1,8 percent. 
Two thirds of these transitions are to rehabilitation, while the remaining third goes directly to 
disability.  
 
Our primary finding is that there are indications that involuntary transitions have been increasing over 
the time period we consider, even when controlling for changes in sick leave and taking explicit 
account of the possibility that individuals might take advantage of the increased availability and 
generosity of the social security system to gain leisure time. Involuntary transitions may have 
increased because work conditions may have become more physically or psychologically challenging 
for some groups. For example Røed and Fevang (2005) find that reorganization in the private and 
public sector can lead to increased sick leave. There might also be less flexibility in some work places, 
so there is less chance that jobs can be adjusted to accommodate workers with impairments. Increases 
in labor force participation may also have drawn workers with more health problems into the 
workforce. 
 
Using the identifying assumptions we can decompose changes in the observed transitions to disability 
and rehabilitation into different components. An increased number of women on sick leave explains 
about half the increase in the number of transitions. Changes in the number of full-time employed in 
the different age groups account for about a third, while changes in benefits levels only account for 
around 4 percent of the increase. Other changes in the composition of married women, such as for 
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example changes in education and work sector, serve to decrease the number making a transition to 
social security. Decreasing unemployment has also played a significant role in increasing the number 
on disability and rehabilitation. Our results are in accordance with other Norwegian studies, such as 
Bratberg (1999) and Andreassen and Kornstad (2006), in finding that economic incentives play a role 
(but a lesser role than implied in these papers), while also finding support of the results of Haveman et 
al. (1991) that other factors are more important.  
 
Our approach is unusual and as far as we know new to the field. We attempt to extract the behavior of 
firms, workers and the government only from observed transitions and the use of theoretical 
considerations. The survey articles of Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and Haveman and Wolfe (2000), 
indicate that most studies of transitions into disability emphasize the choices of the individuals and to 
some extent the workings of the social security system, while little has been done on the behavior of 
the firms. An exception is Danzon (1993), who - in discussing public disability insurance in the U.S. - 
emphasizes the effect of the firm as a potential insurer of the workers. 
 
While there are common trends that most OECD countries share, there are also large differences in 
how the different social security systems work, so the conclusions of many articles do not easily 
generalize from one nation to another. Examples of analyses of different pension systems are 
Anderson et al. (1999), who analyze the effect of changes in pension plans and social security on the 
retirement of men in the United States, Andrén (2008), who analyzes exits from the Swedish labor 
market using a competing risks model, and Harkness (1993) who measures the impact of disability 
benefits on the work choice of disabled males in Canada. 
 
We do not explicitly model the application process, instead we use an indirect method to find the 
probability of the government accepting workers onto social security. In contrast, Halpern and 
Hausman (1986) take explicitly into consideration the application process in their econometric model 
of disability, while Silva and Windmeijer (2001) develop an econometric model that makes it possible 
to separately identify the parameters driving the decisions of the individual and the health care 
provider. Hu et al. (2001) estimate a multistage logit model reflecting the disability determination 
process in the U.S. 
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2. Background and data 
In 1936 the first general public disability insurance law was introduced in Norway, giving assistance 
to the blind and very heavily disabled. A more comprehensive public disability insurance was 
introduced in 1961, and in 1967 this became part of the newly established public social security 
system called "Folketrygden", which remains the bedrock of Norwegian social security. Today, all 
Norwegians, including non-workers, are eligible for disability and rehabilitation pensions. 
 
Initially, the criteria for receiving a disability pension were strict. Over time what was considered a 
serious medical condition expanded. For example, from 1976 alcoholism was recognized as a disease 
giving the right to a disability pension. A large increase in the number of disabled in the 80s led to a 
series of reforms at the beginning of the 90s, based on a consensus that the increase was due to laxer 
criteria for becoming disabled. Reforms enacted in 1991 required that a more rigorous connection 
between a medical illness and work ability had to be shown. There was also an attempt to restrict the 
types of "non-objective" illnesses, but this was abandoned in 1995. In 1992, there was a reduction in 
the pensions received by the disabled, and in 1998 it became more difficult to be declared disabled at a 
young age. 
 
In 2000 a general rule was established requiring that rehabilitation must be attempted before a 
disability pension could be given. In a further attempt to avoid people ending up in a state of 
permanent disability, in 2004 a temporary disability pension was introduced. This implies receiving a 
disability pension for a limited time period, after which the disability must be reevaluated (about 40% 
of new pensioners today receive such a time-limited disability pension). A more detailed discussion of 
the main developments in the Norwegian public disability system can be found in NOU (2007), a 
report from a government appointed commission. 
 
Our data are taken from the event data base FD-Trygd, developed by Statistics Norway. These data 
cover demographic events, education, incomes, transitions in the labor market and social security 
information for the whole Norwegian population from 1992. For each year we observe the transitions 
between six states from the end of the year to the end of the next. We distinguish between the 
following states: Employed (E), Part-time (P), Student, self-employed or unemployed (S), Disabled 
(D), Rehabilitation (R) and Other (O). Thus, the state (S) contains persons who are not ordinary wage 
earners, but have a labor market connection. We define individuals as disabled or on rehabilitation if 
they have a disability degree of 50 percent or more. The analysis assumes that all observations in each 
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year are treated as independent observations. Only married females working full-time (more than 30 
hours per week) are included in the study.  
 
Table 1. The number of transitions from full-time work. Married women 1992-1998* 
 Age group  
 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 Total
E. Employed full-time 222,299 268,195 284,405 223,342 127,030 56,119 1,181,390
P. Part-time 14,899 13,701 11,523 8,282 4,676 2,281 55,362
S. Student / Self-emp. / Unemp. 11,671 12,750 10,736 6,364 2,920 1,439 45,880
R. Rehabilitation 2,696 3,174 3,649 3,227 1,744 617 15,107
D. Disability 263 508 1,039 1,684 2,346 2,957 8,797
O. Other 9,162 5,167 4,247 3,253 2,350 2,547 26,726
Total 260,990 303,495 315,599 246,152 141,066 65,960 1,333,262
Women that died during the period or went abroad are excluded from the table. 
 
The distribution over the states and the relative number making different transitions out of full-time 
employment are given in Table 1. Note that from one year to the end of the next, more women under 
55 years go to rehabilitation than to disability, while the opposite is true for those 55 years or older. 
We have not defined sick leave as a separate state. Instead it is used as an explanatory variable, 
because it is a transitory state with limits on how long one can stay in the state. In addition, most 
workers receive full income compensation from the first day of sick leave, so there are no financial 
disincentives in going on sick leave.  
 
The six age groups 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 are studied separately, giving us six 
fairly homogeneous groups totaling slightly more than 1.3 million instances of full-time work from 
1992 to 1998. The number of married female workers making the transition to disability or 
rehabilitation is 24,004, giving us an average yearly transition rate from full-time employment to 
rehabilitation or disability of 1.8 percent. Two thirds of these transitions are to rehabilitation, while the 
remaining third goes directly to disability. Our results regarding the age group 60-64 are less reliable 
than those for the other age groups because at this age behavior is affected by the Norwegian early 
retirement program "AFP", affecting individuals from the age of 63 from 1997 and from the age of 62 
from 1998. We do not take this program into account in our analysis. See Bratberg et al. (2004) for an 
analysis of this program. 
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Only sick leave financed by the social security system, not including the first 14 days of sick leave 
paid by the employer, is included in the data. Information about sick leave is collected from registers 
administered by the Social security administration (Rikstrygdeverket/NAV). They include information 
on the prognosis given by the medical doctor treating the patient. On the basis of this, we have defined 
four dummy variables for sick leave: 1) A “good prognosis” defined as: “Medical treatment alone is 
assumed to make the patient fully able to work” (the wording in the form filled in by the medical 
doctor), 2) A “bad prognosis” comprising all other prognoses, and 3) “No prognosis”, if a patient for 
some reason does not have any prognosis at all. For those with a “good prognosis” we distinguish 
between those with a short period (less that 60 days) and a long period on sick leave (more than 59 
days1). If the person has been on several sick leaves during the year, it is the most recent leave that 
counts. 
 
Transitions are affected by expected incomes in the different states. Full-time wage income is set equal 
to the observed income of everybody in the initial state (adjusted for inflation using the consumer 
price index), while the incomes in the other states are predicted on the basis of income regressions 
using data on the rest of the population found in FD-Trygd. 
 
Predictions of disability pension income are based on three separate estimations for pensioners with a 
degree of disability of 50-67 percent, 68-83 percent and 84-100 percent, respectively, while 
predictions of rehabilitation income are based on separate estimations for three different categories of 
rehabilitation. Non-labor incomes are equal across states and include child benefits, child care 
allowance and rent allowance.  
 
The upper half of Table 2 shows the average income in the different states. It is notable how little 
variation between different age groups there is in labor incomes, while capital and spousal income 
vary more. Average labor income falls as the females become older, this might be due to a cohort 
effect. The lower half of Table 2 shows the average income replacement ratios in the different states. 
We see that on average a married woman going from full-time employment to rehabilitation would 
expect to receive between 34 and 37 percent of the income she had when fully employed. If she goes 
to disability she would expect to receive between 44 and 49 percent of this income. 
 
                                                     
1 For sick leave periods that extends from one year to the next year, we use the total sick leave period. 
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Table 2. Average income and income replacement ratio (average income divided by average 
full-time income) in different states. 1000 Norwegian kroner and share of full-time 
income 
 Age group 
 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Non-labor income  50  40  34  33  35  39 
Income of spouse 318 323 320 307 273 233 
Labor income as fully employed 250 250 249 248 242 237 
       
Income replacement ratio (share of full time income)     
  - if working part time 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.58 
  - if student or self-employed 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 
  - if in rehabilitation 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 
  - if disabled 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.44 
  - if other 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.15 
  
No. of observations (1,000 persons) 261 303 316 246 141 66 
 
Holen (2007) points out that incomes might not be exogenous. He finds that income in the years 
preceding a transition to disability tends to rise, possibly because workers are trying to maximize the 
pension benefits they will receive later.  
3. Calculating the probability of the observed transitions 
In the following it is being assumed that transitions into disability or rehabilitation (P) can be 
decomposed into a voluntary and an involuntary component according to the following specification: 
(1) ( )1W W W F FP P Q P P Q= + − , 
where subscript W and F refers to workers and firms, respectively. WP is the probability of workers 
wishing to voluntarily go to disability or to rehabilitation, while QW is the probability that if a worker 
wishes to go into disability or rehabilitation, he or she will be permitted to do so. Thus, W WP Q is the 
probability that a worker voluntarily makes the transition into disability or rehabilitation.  Involuntary 
transitions into disability or rehabilitation are given by the term FFW QPP )1( − , where PF is the 
probability of the firm wishing to pressure a worker into disability or rehabilitation against his or her 
will and QF is the probability that a firm will be permitted to pressure a worker into disability or 
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rehabilitation. This transition is conditional on the worker not wanting to go voluntarily into 
rehabilitation or disability (so that (1- PW)PF is the unconditional probability).   
 
Our framework necessitates that all variables are expressed as probabilities. In our data we do not 
observe the probabilities, only the chosen state is being observed. To transform our discrete data to a 
probabilistic form we predict each individual's probability of going either to disability or rehabilitation 
based on the estimates we get using a three state (full-time work, disability, rehabilitation) multinomial 
logit model. In this estimation we apply a reduced form specification using all available explanatory 
variables, leading to 116 parameter estimates for each age group. On the basis of these estimates we 
then calculate the predicted probabilities ˆ DP , ˆ RP  and RD PˆPˆP += where superscript D and R 
denote disability and rehabilitation, respectively. 
 
Since this estimation is used only as a kind of an instrument equation, we do not pay much attention to 
the individual estimates. One reason for not basing our analysis on this direct analysis of the 
transitions to social security is that it gives us negative income effects, probably due to unobserved 
heterogeneity of jobs. While the income replacement ratio associated with going onto social security 
decreases with income, women in high income jobs have higher transition rates to disability and 
rehabilitation than those in low income jobs.  
4. Predicting the desire for disability and rehabilitation 
Predictions of the desire for disability (D) and rehabilitation (R) pension are based on estimation of the 
transitions between the states Employed (E), Part-time (P), Student, self-employed or unemployed (S) 
and Others (O). Using estimations over the restricted choice set {E,P,S,O} to generate predictions for 
the expanded choice set {E,P,S,D,R,O} is possible when the independence from irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) assumption applies, as is assumed in the discrete choice model we use. 
 
Let X denote a vector of non-labor income variables, H a vector of health variables, and I a vector of 
the labor income variables interacted with the demographic dummies. By letting the state specific 
income variables interact with the demographic variables, we get a richer set of alternative specific 
variables. Having young children will, for example, influence the degree to which income in a state 
will affect transitions to this state. 
 
We assume that only income and health enter the utility of the individuals. We choose this 
parsimonious specification because we wish to avoid having too many individual specific variables, 
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since they are not very suitable for making predictions when new alternatives are introduced. As 
mentioned, the wage and demographic variables enter as alternative specific variables, while non-labor 
income and health are the only individual specific variables included. The utility for an individual in 
state k, uk, is given as follows 
(2) { }* * , , , ,k k k k ku X H I k E P S Oα β γ ε= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ∈  
(3) ( ) { }* * log , ,k DR DR k k ku X H I k D Rα β γ κ ε= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ∈ , 
 
where αk*, βk* and γ are parameter vectors and the εk are random terms. Even though we are only 
concerned with transitions to the combined state of either being on disability pension or in 
rehabilitation, we need to distinguish between the two in light of our identification procedure 
discussed later. The κk are correction factors for heterogeneity of the combined state of either being in 
rehabilitation or being disabled (along the lines of McFadden, 1984), and the parameter vectors 
*
DRα and 
*
DRβ are assumed to be the same for both of these states. 
 
Let y denote the choice of an arbitrary individual i that maximizes utility:  
(4) ( )arg max , , , , ,E P S D R Oy u u u u u u= , 
so that y takes on a value of uk, { }, , , , ,k E P S D R O∈ . As shown in McFadden (1984), if the random 
terms εk are independently distributed with a type I extreme value distribution, i.e., the c.d.f. is 
(5) [ ]( ) exp exp( )F x x= − − , 
 
then 
(6) 
( ) { }
* *
1 2
exp
, , , ,k k kkW
X H I
P k E P S O
D D
α β γ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
= ∈
+
 
and 
(7) 
( )( ) { }
* *
1 2
exp log
, ,DR DR k kkW
X H I
P k D R
D D
α β γ κ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
= ∈
+
, 
 
where kWP  denotes the probability that a full–time worker wishes to go to state k, and where 
(8) 
{ }
( )* *1
, , ,
exp l l l
l E P S O
D X H Iα β γ
∈
= + + ⋅  
and 
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(9) 
{ }
( )( )* *2
,
exp logDR DR l l
l D R
D X H Iα β γ κ
∈
= + + ⋅ + . 
 
We assume that disability and rehabilitation have equal weights, 1
2D R
κ κ= = , so that 
(10) 
( ) ( )* *
1 2
exp exp
exp log
2
D R
DR DR
D R
W W W
I I
X H
P P P
D D
γ γ
α β  ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +     
= + =
+
. 
 
Since the IIA property applies, response probabilities for choice in restricted or expanded choice sets 
are obtained simply by deleting or adding terms in the denominator. Hence we may estimate all the 
parameters except those in *DRα  and 
*
DRβ  by just looking at the subset of transitions going from full-
time employment to the states employed (E), part-time (P), student/self-employed/unemployed (S) and 
others (O). Assuming the IIA condition applies, we estimate the four probabilities , ,E P SW W WP P P , and 
O
WP , given by 
(11) 
( ) { }
* *
1
exp
, , , ,k k kkW
X H I
P k E P S O
D
α β γ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
= ∈ . 
 
We normalize the parameters so that the log-odds ratios can be written 
(12) ( ) { }log ,   , ,
k
W
k k k EE
W
P X H I I k P S O
P
α β γ= ⋅ + ⋅ + − ∈ . 
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the transitions from full-time employment to the three states: 
part-time, student/self-employed/unemployed and others. The estimates are presented as odds ratios, 
and incomes are in logarithms. Non-significant variables have been eliminated as well as the child 
variable (saying whether a worker's youngest child is 5 years and younger) for the oldest age group 
because very few women at this age have so young children. The spouse variables (interacted with 
income) for the oldest age group were eliminated because their inclusion gave a negative estimate of 
the income parameter for the wage alone.  
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Table 3. Odds ratios’ parameter estimates for female full-time workers’ transitions by age group 
  Age group 
  35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Variables varying with the alternatives        
Wage and pension income        
  - if spouse work full-time  1.49 1.92 1.90 1.83 1.11 1.10 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
  - if spouse work part-time  1.38 1.67 1.59 1.57  - 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)   
  - if spouse stud. / indep.*  1.17 1.43 1.39 1.29  - 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   
  - if spouse rehab. / disab.  1.47 1.64 1.75 1.62  - 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)   
  - if spouse other  1.25 1.58 1.58 1.53  - 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)   
  - if youngest child < 6 years  1.06 0.85 0.74 0.53  - 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10)   
  - if youngest child 6-17 years  1.34 1.04 0.91 0.87 0.86  
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  
  - if lowest educ. Level  0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.92 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
        
Constant part-time 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 stud/indep. 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 other 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Individual specific variables        
Capital income part-time 1.10 1.05 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.15 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 stud/indep. 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.10  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
 Others 1.11 1.03   1.04 1.06 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Spouse's income part-time 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.04  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
 stud/indep.  1.04 1.08 1.05 1.05  
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
 Others 1.03  0.98    
  (0.01)  (0.01)    
Healthy, sick earlier part-time 1.53 1.60  1.80 1.51  
  (0.16) (0.18)  (0.23) (0.27)  
 stud/indep.  1.51     
   (0.8)     
 Others 1.94 1.98 1.49   1.88 
  (0.24) (0.32) (0.29)   (0.44) 
Sick < 60 days part-time 1.33 1.39 1.31 1.63 1.79 2.36 
  with good prognosis  (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.26) (0.45) 
 stud/indep.  1.24     
   (0.13)     
 Others 3.23 1.74 2.16 1.86 1.79 1.88 
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Table 3. Cont. 
  Age group 
  35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
  (0.25) (0.24) (0.30) (0.31) (0.37) (0.38) 
Sick ≥ 60 days part-time 1.43 1.68 1.83 2.00 2.85 2.38 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.28) (0.35) 
 stud/indep. 1.30 1.30   1.43  
  (0.12) (0.12)   (0.24)  
 Others 3.42 1.86 2.84 2.23 2.59 2.96 
  (0.23) (0.22) (0.29) (0.27) (0.36) (0.38) 
Sick with no prognosis part-time  1.51 1.38 1.42 1.84 1.57 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.26) (0.33) 
 stud/indep. 1.58    1.65 1.64 
  (0.16)    (0.31) (0.42) 
 Others 2.62 2.00 2.07 2.14 2.08 1.70 
  (0.24) (0.28) (0.31) (0.33) (0.39) (0.33) 
Sick with bad prognosis part-time 2.15 2.63 2.76 3.38 3.95 3.42 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.28 (0.33) (0.42) (0.50) 
 stud/indep. 2.03 1.79     
  (0.29) (0.23)     
 Others 2.37 3.26 3.73 4.65 5.26 6.20 
  (0.36) (0.47) (0.52) (0.61) (0.67) (0.69) 
        
Number of observations  258,031 299,813 310,911 241,241 136.976 62,386 
Number of significant estimates  28 30 25 24 22 17 
Log-likelihood  140,967 132,294 116,831 81,684 45,849 26,815 
Pseudo R2  0.606 0.682 0.729 0.756 0.759 0.690 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Non-significant variables have been dropped. A blank implies the variable is insignificant. 
- : implies a variable is dropped for other reasons. 
*: Includes student/self-employed/unemployed.  
 
From Table 3 we see that the wage and pension income in a state has a positive effect on the odds 
ratios. This effect is most pronounced for the age groups 40-44, 45-49 and 50-54. Having a spouse 
who is not working full-time, increases the effect of the wage income variable for those aged from 35 
to 54 years. Having children increases the effect of wage and pension income for younger women, and 
decreases the effect for older women. Low education decreases the effect of wage and pension income, 
probably reflecting the fact that those with low education have less flexibility and are therefore more 
locked into the state of full-time employment. High outside income, either capital or spousal income, 
will in general increase the probability of a transition out of full-time employment. 
 
Table 3 also shows the effect of the health variables on transitions out of full-time work. We see that 
all types of long term sick leave imply an increased probability of leaving this state, with the largest 
effect being on the transition to the state “other”. As expected, those with a bad prognosis have a 
higher probability of going out of the labor force and into the state “others”. It is more surprising to 
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see that women in the age group 35-39 with a good prognosis have much larger odds ratio for going to 
the state “others” than those with a good prognosis in the other age groups. This may indicate that 
doctors are being too optimistic with regard to the chances of some of these individuals. 
 
In what follow we will use the parameter estimates in Table 3 to make predictions of the probability of 
voluntarily applying either disability or rehabilitation pension, denoted by WˆP . This can be done by 
making assumptions about the parameter vectors  *DRα  and 
*
DRβ  of Eq. 10. We assume that the 
parameters describing the effect of non-labor income and health on the transition to the state “others” 
are equal to their effect on the transition to disability and rehabilitation, i.e., oDR αα =
*  and oDR ββ =* . 
Then PW can be predicted by 
(13) 
( ) ( )( )
1 2
1ˆˆ ˆ ˆexp log exp exp
2ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
O O D R
D R
W W W
X H I I
P P P
D D
α β γ γ  ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅    
= + =
+
, 
where 1Dˆ  and 2Dˆ  are equal to D1 and D2, but with the estimated parameter vectors ˆˆ ,O Oα β  and γˆ  
having been substituted in for ,, OO βα  and γ . Our assumptions about *DRα  and *DRβ  imply that the 
state “others” is sufficiently different from the other states, including disability and rehabilitation, so 
that it is sensible to assume that the IIA property holds, but on the other hand similar enough to 
disability and rehabilitation that we can assume that the parameter vectors α and β are equal in all 
these three states. The similarity is in being out of the labor force, while the state “others” is different 
from disability or rehabilitation, because it avoids both the cost of applying for social security and the 
stigma of being dependent on the government. In addition, one cannot be assured of getting a full 
disability pension. Our finding above that long term sick leave has its largest effect on transitions out 
of full-time work to the state “others” is another reason for using the parameters of this state. 
 
It follows from our assumptions that if the income received in the three states is the same, ID=IR=IO, 
then the non-random part of utility received in the three states will also be equal, uD=uR=uO. If there 
are mainly disadvantages of being disabled or in rehabilitation compared to being in the state “others” 
(such as having to participate in rehabilitation programs), this implication is unrealistic. In isolation, it 
implies that our assumptions place too great a value on being either disabled or in rehabilitation. 
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Table 4. Percent of transitions to disability or rehabilitation that are involuntary. Women aged 
35-64 in full-time employment  
 Year 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Simple method 64 61 61 63 65 67 67 
Using identifying assumptions 67 65 66 68 69 71 71 
 
Table 5. Percent of transitions to disability or rehabilitation that are involuntary. Women aged 
35-64 in full-time employment. Annual average  
 Age group 
 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Simple method 57 65 65 67 68 64 
Using identifying assumptions 58 68 70 73 74 66 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 present two measures of the extent of involuntary transitions to social security, 
both based on the above estimation of the desire to voluntarily go onto social security. The first 
measure – the simple method in the tables - is calculated by the relative difference ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆWP P P− , 
while the measure based on identifying assumptions will be presented in the next section. Both 
measures indicate that about two thirds of those going to social security are doing so because of 
conditions at work. According to the simple residual measure, as shown in Table 4, the percent 
involuntary transitions ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆWP P P−  among all ages decreases from 64 percent in 1992 to 61 percent 
in 1993 and 1994, and then increases every year until reaching 67 percent in 1998. Considering the 
distribution over different ages we see in Table 5 that the percentage of involuntary transitions 
increases with age up to the age group 55-59 years, after which it then falls (many in the oldest age 
group have the possibility of early retirement).       
 
Since our measures are based on the degree to which the predictions of P  and WP  do not coincide, we 
are very reliant on the quality of our prediction of WP . While our model may be simple, it should be 
noted that we are looking at reasonably homogeneous groups, married women in five year intervals, 
using a fairly large set of explanatory variables. The trend over time should be less dependent on how 
we project WP  than the levels. We see from Table 1 that there has been an increasing tendency for 
firms to push workers into disability or rehabilitation, with an exception for 1992. We suspect that our 
data for 1992 are influenced by the changes made in the social security system in 1991 and 1992. 
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These changes might have caused queues in the treatment of applications at the social security 
administration, and these queues might influence the inflow into disability benefit some time  after the 
change in the system.  
 
The effect of pension benefits can be illustrated by simulating the effects of a 10 percent increase in 
the level of such benefits. Such a change increases the number of individuals who voluntarily go to 
rehabilitation or disability by around 0.6 percentage points among the younger age groups, while 
having no effect on the transitions of the two oldest age groups. 
 
Now define a government preference indicator, θ, measuring the degree to which government is more 
favorable to rehabilitation than the workers.  It is defined as the difference between the acceptance 
ratio for rehabilitation and the acceptance ratio for disability, 
(14) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
R D
R D
W W
P P
P P
θ = − , 
which is greater than zero if ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆR D R DW WP P P P> . If the government preference indicator is greater 
than zero, θ>0,  the government has a relative stronger preference for rehabilitation than the workers, 
and if θ<0 the government has a relative stronger preference for disability. 
 
Table 6. The number of females to which government favors rehabilitation versus disability  
 Age group 
 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Favors disability, θ<0 390 420 4,083 46,000 82,448 40,331
Favors rehabilitation, θ≥0 216,868 261,408 272,748 169,914 21,569 226
 
Table 6 shows the distribution of θ across the different age groups. We see that for younger workers 
the government has a much stronger preference for rehabilitation than the workers, while for older 
workers the opposite is the case. This is probably due to the benefits of getting younger workers back 
into the labor force being large, because of the many years they can potentially stay in the labor force. 
On the other hand, for older workers the costs of rehabilitation may outweigh the expected benefits, 
since they are close to retirement. 
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5. Identifying the firm and the government probabilities 
We now introduce an alternative method for calculating the probability that the firms wish to pension 
the workers if they do not want a pension themselves, PF, and the probabilities that a desire for 
disability or rehabilitation will actually be accepted by the government, QW and QF. The method uses 
separate data on disability and rehabilitation to identify the combined aggregate probabilities PF, QW 
and QF. Define DGP and
R
GP as the probabilities that the government will accept a wish to go to 
disability and rehabilitation, respectively. A detailed derivation of the results can be found in 
Appendix A. Assume that the basic equation given in Eq. (1) applies to disability and rehabilitation 
separately so that: 
(15) ( )1D D D D R D DG W W W G FP P P P P P P= ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅  
(16) ( )1R R R D R R RG W W W G FP P P P P P P= ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ . 
 
Notice that we here, implicitly, assume that when screening individuals, the government does not 
distinguish between those applying voluntarily or involuntarily, so the same kGP  applies to both 
k
WP  
and kFP  in Eqs. (15) and (16). In aggregate, the government acceptance probabilities will differ for 
voluntary and involuntary transitions, see appendix A1 and A2.  
 
To identify the unknown probabilities , ,D D RF G FP P P , and 
R
GP  we now introduce two identifying 
assumptions given by 
(17) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
D D D
G W
R R R
G W
P P P k
P P P
= ⋅  
and 
(18) 
ˆ
ˆ
D D D
G F W
R R R
G F W
P P P
P P P
⋅
=
⋅
, 
where k is an adjustment factor taking into account whether the government has a stronger or weaker 
relative preference for rehabilitation compared to disability than the workers (as measured by the 
government preference indicator, θ, we introduced earlier). The probabilities DWP , RWP , PD and PR are 
assumed to be given by the predicted probabilities obtained earlier. The predicted probabilities 
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,D D RF G FP P P  and ˆ
R
GP  are treated as given, non-stochastic variables.  
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Ignoring prediction errors, the ratio on the left hand side of Eq. (17) is the ratio between the 
probability of an individual attempting to go into disability relative to rehabilitation (either because of 
own desire or because the firm desires it), 
( )
( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ1ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
D D R DD D
W W W FG
R R R D R R
G W W W F
P P P PP P
P P P P P P
+ − − ⋅
=
+ − − ⋅
. 
The left hand side of Eq. (18) is the ratio between the probabilities of an individual actually being 
pushed by the firm into disability relative to being pushed into rehabilitation, 
( )
( )
ˆ ˆ1 number actually pushed by firms into disability
ˆ ˆ number actually pushed by firms into rehabilitation1
D R D D
W W G F
D R R R
W W G F
P P P P
P P P P
− − ⋅ ⋅
=
− − ⋅ ⋅
. 
 
According to our two identifying assumptions both these ratios are determined by the ratio of the 
number of workers wishing to go to disability relative to rehabilitation, ˆ ˆ/D RW WP P . We use the workers’ 
preferences to determine these two ratios because it seems reasonable to think that the firms do not 
care whether the workers they want to get rid of go to disability or rehabilitation. In contrast, the 
individuals are assumed to both care about and having a possibility of influencing which state they go 
to. 
 
To see how the adjustment factor k affects the probabilities we rewrite Eq. (17) as  
(19) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
R R D
G
D R D
G W W
P P P k
P P P
 
= ⋅   
. 
 
If k>1, we see that this will, cet. par., increase the probability of being accepted into rehabilitation, RGP , 
relative to being accepted into disability, DGP . We assume that k is determined by the government 
preference indicator θ, introduced earlier in Eq. (14).  
 
When the probabilities of desiring to go to rehabilitation or disability are greater than the probability 
of actually doing so ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ and R R D DW WP P P P< < ), which we will refer to as the normal case, we assume 
that k=1/(1-θ). In this case, if the government has relatively stronger preferences for rehabilitation than 
the workers ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/ /R D R DW WP P P P> ), then θ>0 and k>1. Similarly, if the government has relatively 
stronger preferences for disability than the workers ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/ /R D R DW WP P P P< ), then θ<0 and k<1.  
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Table 7. Percent of age group in different categories and number of deleted observations  
 Age group 
 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
i)     and R R D DW WP P P P< <  96.4 96.3 95.8 94.6 79.3 67.9 
ii)     and R R D DW WP P P P≥ <  3.1 2.2 1.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 
iii)     and R R D DW WP P P P< ≥  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 14.9 26.4 
iv)     and R R D DW WP P P P≥ ≥  0.4 1.5 2.7 4.5 5.6 5.6 
       
Number of observations deleted 25 1 0 1 0 14 
 
The identifying equations are changed when the normal case does not apply. If ˆ ˆR RWP P≥ , so that more 
workers are going into rehabilitation than the number wishing to do so, then we assume that the 
probability of being admitted to rehabilitation is equal to one, RGP  = 1 (with this requirement replacing 
the second assumption) and that k=1/θ. In this case θ will always be greater than zero and k will 
usually be greater than one, unless there is a very large difference between ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/  and /R R D DW WP P P P . 
Similarly, if ˆ ˆD DWP P≥ , so that more workers are going into disability than the number wishing to do 
so, then we replace the second assumption by the requirement that the probability of being admitted to 
disability is equal to one, 1DGP =  and that k=-θ. In this case θ will always be less than zero and k will 
usually be less than one, skewing the government probabilities in the direction of disability. 
 
If both RW
R PP ≥  and DW
D PP ≥ , then we replace both assumptions (17) and (18) by the equations 
R
GP  = 1 and 
D
GP  = 1. In this case we assume that the individuals are not hindered in seeking either 
disability or rehabilitation.  
 
Table 7 shows how many individuals fall into the different categories and how many observations are 
deleted due to the calculated probabilities being outside the interval [0,1]. For all age groups the 
normal case, case i) in the table, is predominant. For the age groups 55-59 and 60-64 there is also a 
sizable number of women who have a higher probability of going to disability than of desiring to do 
so.  
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The two identifying relationships together with the disaggregate equations (15) and (16) are sufficient 
to identify the four disaggregate variables , ,D D RF G FP P P , and 
R
GP  and subsequently the aggregate 
probabilities PF, Qw and QF. One can solve these equations by letting Eq. (17) determine the ratio of 
the government acceptance probabilities, ˆ ˆ/D RG GP P , while Eq. (18) then determines the relative ratio of 
firm probabilities, ˆ ˆ/D RF FP P . Calculations of the firm and government probabilities in all cases can be 
found in Appendix A. For the normal case they are given as 
 
ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ
R D
R DD
D W W
G D D
W
D
W
P P
P PPP
P P
P
− +
= ⋅
+
,    
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ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ
R
R
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P
= ⋅
+
, 
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ˆˆ 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 ˆ ˆ
DR
D W
F R D R R D
W W W
R D
W W
PPP
P P P P P
P P
= ⋅ ⋅
− −
− +
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ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ1
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R W
F D D R
W W W
PPP
P P P
= ⋅
− −
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From this we can now calculate the aggregate probability D RF F FP P P= + , and the aggregate 
probabilities QW and QF. The number of individuals who go involuntarily to disability or 
rehabilitation, using this method, are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. Using the identifying 
assumptions instead of the much simpler method described in the introduction gives us a 2 to 6 percent 
higher rate of involuntary transitions. Both methods show a fairly large difference between the number 
of involuntary transitions among the youngest age group and the other age groups. It seems that 
among women aged 35 to 39 a much higher proportion of the transitions to rehabilitation and 
disability occurs voluntarily. To some extent this may be due to a self-selection process where women 
who do not enjoy their work drop out of full-time employment as they get older.  
6. Estimation of firm and government probabilities 
To obtain a fuller description of the factors behind the increases in disability and rehabilitation, we use 
the logit model to estimate the relations for the firm probability PF and the average government 
probability Q=(QW +QF)/2 separately for each age group. Since the estimated probabilities 
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,D D RF G FP P P  and ˆ
R
GP  are treated as non-stochastic variables, our estimates are conditional on these 
predicted values. Since the firm probability PF and the average government probability Q=(QW +QF)/2 
in these cases are a probability instead of the usual 0/1 transition variable, we applied two different  
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estimation strategies giving qualitatively the same results. The two approaches where a grouped 
variable approach (blogit in Stata) with wage income grouped in NOK 25,000 intervals and a GLM 
(Generalized Linear Model) approach in Stata, which allowed us to do the estimations directly on the 
calculated probabilities.  
 
Our earlier estimation of the desire for disability or rehabilitation, PW, did not use all the available 
variables, being confined to income, health, the spouse's situation, whether the worker has a low 
education and the number of children. This was done, both because we believe this subset is most 
easily interpretable as determining utility independently of the work situation, and because we wished 
to have a small number of individual-specific variables when predicting the probabilities of going to 
disability or rehabilitation. We follow up this line of reasoning in the estimation of the relations for PF  
and Q, using only variables for each probability that we think can be clearly linked to either the 
conditions on the job (in the case of PF) or to the government screening process Q. 
 
In estimating the relation for the firm probability PF, we assume that the combination of wage income, 
unemployment rate, length and field of education, production sector and localization describes the job 
situation of a worker, while the available health variables are considered indicators of how well the 
worker is coping with his job. Time is not used as an explanatory variable in the estimation of the 
relations for PW and PF, because we in the case of workers and firms wish to emphasize explanatory 
variables that can be interpreted “easily”. On the other hand, we do not believe it is possible to derive 
such “structural” relationships for the government screening process, therefore allowing Q to depend 
on a vector of time dummies. We interact time and a good prognosis, to see if there has been a change 
over time in the effect of a good prognosis (since many with a good prognosis end up on social 
security, one might expect that doctors over time become more reserved in giving this prognosis). In 
addition we use a relative age variable giving the age within the 5-year cohort we are looking at. For 
example, a 37 year old women will belong to the cohort 35-39 with relative age equal to 2 (37-35=2). 
 
Tables 8 gives the estimated coefficients for the firm probabilities, controlling for 10 types of 
education, 10 production sectors and the 20 counties in Norway. Table 9 gives the estimated 
coefficients for the government probabilities.  As with the table showing the estimated coefficients for 
PW, we only report results after non-significant variables have been dropped. Table 8 shows that 
individuals in high income jobs have a higher probability of being pushed out by the firms, as also was 
noted in Section 3. This can be due to the fact that monitoring and regulating the output of high 
income workers can be more difficult than for low income workers. If this is the case, firms have 
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fewer instruments to deal with high income workers who are not performing satisfactorily and 
therefore feel forced to increase the use of disability pensions. It might also be due to it being more 
difficult to fire high income workers, since they usually have worked longer at a firm.   
 
Table 8.  Some of the estimated coefficients for the firms' probability of wanting to push workers 
onto social security.* GML-estimation (see text)   
 Age group 
 35-39 40-45 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Log of wage income 0.93 0.96 0.69 0.52 0.77 0.92 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.0)9 (0.11) (0.14) 
Unemployment -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06  -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) 
Education level 0.22  -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 
 (0.08)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education level squared -0.02 -0.01     
 (0.00) (0.00)     
Healthy - - - - - - 
       
Not sick, but been on sick leave 2.76 2.45 2.31 2.43 2.54 2.09 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21) 
Sick < 60 days with good prog. 3.36 3.64 3.54 3.71 3.61 3.36 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
Sick ≥ 60 days with good prog. 4.42 4.62 4.61 4.59 4.85 4.64 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Sick with a bad prognosis 5.38 5.19 5.20 5.37 5.47 5.56 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.059 (0.06) (0.07) 
Sick with no prognosis 3.13 3.28 3.09 3.11 3.20 3.05 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
       
Number of observations 225,233 271,876 289,093 228,252 131,120 59,679 
Log-likelihood 8218 9986 11901 10660 7121 4747 
Number of parameters 24 23 23 24 16 15 
Pseudo R2 0.352 0.362 0.369 0.404 0.455 0.494 
       
*:All the estimated coefficients can be found in Appendix D. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors do not reflect that the left-hand-side variable is stochastic. 
Non-significant variables have been dropped. A blank implies the variable was insignificant. - : implies a 
variable was dropped for other reasons. 
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Table 9. Estimated coefficients for government probabilities by age group 
 Age group 
 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
       
Age within group 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.27 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) 
Age within group squared -0.02   0.01  0.02 
 (0.01)   (0.00)  (0.01) 
Health condition       
Healthy (reference) - - - - - - 
Not sick but been on sick leave 3.42 3.69 4.19 6.31 - 2.93 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.38)  (0.19) 
Sick <60 days with good prognosis 3.92 3.71 3.56 6.05 - 7.15 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.26)  (1.15) 
Sick ≥60 days with  good prognosis 4.20 5.07 6.02 8.77 - 6.32 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.70)  (0.45) 
Sick with a bad prognosis 6.37 6.95 9.27 8.19 - 3.63 
 (0.17) (0.27) (0.97) (0.66)  (0.11) 
Sick with no prognosis 3.72 3.98 4.45 5.06 - 5.40 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.17)  (0.42) 
1992 (reference year) - - - - - - 
1993 0.12 -0.11 -0.06  0.09 0.25 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.04) 
1994 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.15  -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) 
1995 0.64 0.34 0.40 0.31 0.22 0.43 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
1996 0.50 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.45 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
1997 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.30 0.27 0.49 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
1998 0.61 0.33 0.53 0.45 0.44 0.82 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Constant -3.50 -2.54 -2.24 -1.72 -1.23 -1.93 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
Second order effects       
Sick with good prognosis x  1993   0.73  - - 
   (0.24)    
Sick with good prognosis  x  1994  0.51   -  
  (0.18)     
Sick with good prognosis x  1995 -0.43 0.49   -  
 (0.11) (0.18)     
Sick with good prognosis x  1996 -0.25 -0.29   -  
 (0.10) (0.14)     
Sick with good prognosis  x  1997   0.71  -  
   (0.21)    
Sick with good prognosis  x  1998 -0.34 0.49 0.49  -  
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.20)    
       
Number of observations 225,233 271,876 289,093 228,252 123,978 59,459
Number parameters 17 17 16 13 7 14
Log-likelihood 38,272 65,677 87,361 79,390 53,943 23,992
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.156 0.129 0.119 0.010 0.146
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Non-significant variables have been dropped. A blank implies the variable was insignificant. - : implies a 
variable was dropped for other reasons. 
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The estimates also indicate that increasing unemployment will decrease the probability of being 
pushed out into rehabilitation or disability (unemployment generally fell in the period we are looking 
at). We thereby find support for the hypothesis that in periods of low unemployment more marginal 
workers are employed, leading to higher transition rates to disability. Sick leave has, as expected, a 
very strong effect on the firms’ desire to get rid of a worker. Of notable results for the variables not 
reported in Table 8 (type of education, production sector and county), we find that in the transport 
sector firms are more likely to push individuals into disability (with non-significant results for age 
groups 40-44 and 55-59) than in other sectors, while firms in the financial sector are less likely to do 
so. Firms in the western part of Norway (Rogaland, Hordaland, and Sogn and Fjordane) have a lower 
probability of pushing women aged between 40 and 54 into disability, while in the northern part of 
Norway (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) firms have an increased probability of doing so to older 
workers aged 50-64 compared with firms in the capital city, Oslo.  
 
Table 10. Average predicted probabilities for going on social security 1992-1998. Percent 
 Age group 
 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Pˆ  1.3 1.4 1.6 2.2 3.1 6.0 
WˆP  4.7 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.8 4.2 
FˆP  1.3 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.9 5.3 
Qˆ  8.1 13.3 19.3 25.8 38.1 37.7 
 
Table 9 shows that for all age groups the estimated time effects suggest there has been an increase in 
the probability that the government screening process will lead to a person getting rehabilitation or 
disability. The increase in the estimated time effects is not uniform, for example for some age groups 
there are a fall in 1997. The estimates indicate that the attempt made in 1991 to restrict the numbers of 
applicants being accepted in rehabilitation or disability had a temporary effect during the first couple 
of years, but then the acceptance rates started to increase. The emphasis on rehabilitation that has been 
at the center of reform efforts during the last 15 years may, unintentionally, have increased the total 
number going into either disability or rehabilitation. Increased possibilities for rehabilitation may have 
given workers better possibilities to exit the labor force, instead of only helping those otherwise 
destined for disability to return to the labor force.A summary of the average predicted probabilities  
across years for going onto social security (either disability or rehabilitation) is given in Table 10.  
From the table we see that the average probability of actually going onto social security, Pˆ , increases 
with age, while the average probability of desiring to go on social security, WˆP , decreases with age 
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(except for the oldest age group). The desire of the firms to push workers onto social security, FˆP , and 
the probability of the government accepting an application for social security, Qˆ , increases with age.  
7. Decomposition of transitions into rehabilitation and disability 
benefit 
We now decompose the change in rehabilitation and disability from 1992 to 1998 into seven factors, 
changing one factor at a time, and then predicting the resulting probabilities using the estimated 
relationships. Table 11 presents the decomposition for the six age groups we have studied, giving the 
percent of the total observed change due to each factor (each row includes all factors, thereby 
summing to 100 percent). Note that the contribution from a particular variable depends on the ordering 
of the changes; the numbering of the simulations are starting from the left of the table. Thus, the first 
column shows the increase in disability and rehabilitation (in percent of the total change) that occurs in 
two simulations where all variables are kept at their 1992 level except the size of the population 
(married women working full-time), which is set equal to that in 1992 and 1998, respectively. Based 
on the probabilities we get when the population is set equal to the one in 1998, the second column 
shows the change (increase) that occurs if we set the number of individuals who are on sick leave 
equal to the level found in 1998. The third column shows the effect of letting the composition of the 
cohort with respect to all demographic and firm characteristics (for example changes in education or in 
the sectors they are employed) reflect the situation in 1998 instead of in 1992 when the reference 
probabilities include both the effect of the 1998-population and the sick leave level of 1998. The 
fourth column measures the effect of change in the income variables2 and the fifth column the effect of 
change in unemployment from 1992 to 1998. In the sixth column the effect of the dummies for year 
used in the prediction of the government acceptance probability are considered. Finally, the seventh 
column shows approximation and prediction errors.  
 
The first column in Table 11 shows that the contribution from changes in the size of the population 
varies significantly across age groups during the period. The strongest contribution  was among the 
married females aged 50-59, where the increase in group size accounted for half the change in 
transitions to social security. As expected, an increased number of workers on sick leave is the most 
important factor behind the increase in disability and rehabilitation, especially in the younger age 
                                                     
2 This simulation reflects the effects of changes in the income received when disabled or in rehabilitation compared to the 
income when working. 
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groups. Sick leave, disability and rehabilitation are closely related events. However, it is notable that 
factors other than sick leave have such an important impact. Changes in the population composition of 
the groups we are looking at have in isolation reduced the number of workers going to social security, 
while changes in the income received when disabled or in rehabilitation (compared to the income 
when working) have contributed to an increase in these transitions. Decreases in unemployment 
explain between 10 and 19 percent of the increase in disability and rehabilitation for all age groups 
except for women aged 50-59, for which  the parameter estimate for unemployment was found to be 
insignificant. This indicates that more workers with marginal health are being employed into full-time 
positions. 
 
Table 11. Decomposition of the transition from full-time employment into rehabilitation and 
disability from 1992 to 1998. Percent contribution by each factor  
 Factors   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Age 
groupa Population 
Number of 
workers on 
sick leave 
Population 
composition Income 
Unemploy-
ment Year 
Approx. & 
pred. errors Sum 
35-39 8 51 -8 5 12 28 3 100 
40-44 16 62 -12 7 18 16 -7 100 
45-49 16 56 -10 5 19 19 -6 100 
50-54 47 32 -5 3 11 9 3 100 
55-59 52 38 -4 4 0 10 1 100 
60-64 0 64 -9 4 10 31 1 100 
Total 29 47 -7 4 11 16 -1 100 
a: Age in 1992 
 
The year dummies enter only the government acceptance probabilities and indicate unexplained 
changes in the way the social security system works. They are the third largest factor after changes in 
population and in sick leave, being especially important for the youngest and oldest age groups.  
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8. Conclusions 
Based on predictions of workers’ desire for disability and rehabilitation we develop two measures for 
the extent to which transitions to social security are voluntary and the extent to which workers are 
pushed into disability or rehabilitation. Our tentative findings are that most women who go to 
disability or rehabilitation would have preferred to be able to continue working, if work conditions had 
been better matched with their capabilities. In addition, the percentage of involuntary transitions has 
been increasing over time. We find that the probability that a married women working full-time will 
wish to go on social security decreases with age (maybe due to a self-selection effect), while the 
probability that the firms wish to push such a worker onto disability increases with age. The 
probability of the government accepting a worker onto disability or rehabilitation also increases with 
age.  
 
While changes in the probabilities affecting each worker are important, we find that the most 
important factors behind the observed increase in disability and rehabilitation are increases in the 
number of workers and the number on sick leave in each age group.  Decreasing unemployment has 
increased the number of women going to disability or rehabilitation, indicating that increased 
employment draws less healthy workers into the labor force. Increases in benefits relative to labor 
income have increased the desire for leaving the labor force. 
 
Our results are based on two sets of assumptions. First, that our estimation of the desire to leave the 
labor force can be used to predict the desire for going either to disability or rehabilitation, and second, 
that our identifying assumptions are reasonable. There is a need to investigate these assumptions more 
closely. Still, we think that our results indicate that, when discussing disability, it is important to focus 
as much on the behavior of the firm and on work conditions as on the behavior of the workers. 
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Appendix A. Calculating the probabilities , ,D D RFi FiGiP P P , and RGiP  
For the normal case, with ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ and R R D Di Wi i WiP P P P< < , we have the 4 equations, (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and 
(A.4) in the 4 probabilities , ,D D RFi Gi FiP P P  and 
R
GiP :  
(A.1) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1D D D D R D Di Gi Wi Wi Wi Gi FiP P P P P P P= ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ , 
(A.2) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1R R R D R R Ri Gi Wi Wi Wi Gi FiP P P P P P P= ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ , 
(A.3) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
R R D
Gi i Wi
iD D R
Gi i Wi
P P P k
P P P
= ⋅ ⋅ , 
(A.4) 
ˆ
ˆ
D R D
Fi Gi Wi
R D R
Fi Gi Wi
P P P
P P P
= ⋅ , 
where i denotes individual, 1
1i i
k
θ
=
−
, and 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
R D
i i
i R D
Wi Wi
P P
P P
θ = − . 
The parameter θi is in the normal case always less than 1, so ( )1 1i ik θ= −  will always increase the 
probability of RGiP  relative to the probability of 
D
GiP . 
Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) can be rewritten as 
 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1D D D D R D Di Gi Wi Wi Wi Gi FiP P P P P P P− ⋅ = − − ⋅ ⋅ , 
 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1R R R D R R Ri Gi Wi Wi Wi Gi FiP P P P P P P− ⋅ = − − ⋅ ⋅ . 
Dividing the first of these equations with the second one and using Eq. (A.4) one gets 
(A.5) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
D R
D Ri i
Gi GiD R
Wi Wi
P P P P
P P
− = − , 
or equivalently  
 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
R D
R Di i
i Gi GiR D
Wi Wi
P P P P
P P
θ = − = − . 
In the normal case, the parameter θi indicates the difference in the rehabilitation and disability ratios, 
which is the same as the difference in the government admittance probabilities. If 0iθ > , then 
R D
Gi GiP P> , and if 0iθ < , then 
R D
Gi GiP P< . 
A.1 Calculating the government probabilities RGiP  and 
D
GiP  in the normal case 
Eq. (A.3) can be written 
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ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
R D
R Di Wi
Gi i GiR D
Wi i
P PP k P
P P
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . 
Inserting for RGiP  in Eq. (A.5), gives us 
(A.6) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
D R
i i
D R D
D Wi Wi i
Gi D R D
i i Wi
iD R
Wi Wi
P P
P P PP
P P Pk
P P
−
= ⋅
− ⋅
. 
In the same manner we find RGiP  by inserting 
 
ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ
D R
D Ri Wi
Gi GiD R
iWi i
P PP P
kP P
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
into Eq. (A1) leading to 
(A.7) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
D R
i i
D R R
R Wi Wi i
Gi iD R R
i i Wi
iD R
Wi Wi
P P
P P PP k
P P Pk
P P
−
= ⋅ ⋅
− ⋅
. 
The government probabilities are always positive in the normal case with ˆ ˆ 1R Ri WiP P <  and ˆ ˆ 1
D D
i WiP P < . 
This can be seen by inserting for 
 1 1 0ˆ ˆ1
1 ˆ ˆ
i R D
i i i
R D
Wi Wi
k
P P
P P
θ
= = >
−
− +
 
into Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7), giving us 
 
ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ
R D
i i
R D D
D Wi Wi i
Gi D D
i Wi
D
Wi
P P
P P PP
P P
P
− +
= ⋅
+
 
 
ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
− +
= ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅
+ − + +
R D
i i
R D R R
R Wi Wi i i
Gi D R R D D R
i Wi i i i Wi
D R D D
Wi Wi Wi Wi
P P
P P P PP
P P P P P P
P P P P
. 
These two equations can equivalently be written 
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( ) ˆ1 ˆ
ˆ
1 ˆ
θ− ⋅
=
+
D
i
i D
D Wi
Gi D
i
D
Wi
P
PP
P
P
 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
θ+ − +
= = =
+ + +
R D R D D
i i i i i
iR D R D D
R Wi Wi Wi Wi Wi
Gi D D D
i i i
D D D
Wi Wi Wi
P P P P P
P P P P PP
P P P
P P P
, 
with 
 
( )
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
1 11 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
1ˆ 1 1 1
1 ˆ
θ θθ θ
θ
θ θ θθ
 
− + ⋅ ++ + ⋅ +   
= = = = + ⋅
− − −
− ⋅
DD D D
Wii Wi Wi
i ii i DR D D D
iGi Wi i i
iD D
Gi i i ii
i D
Wi
PP P P
PP P P P
P P
P
, 
so that if 0iθ >  then R DGi GiP P> , and if 0iθ <  then R DGi GiP P< . 
The number of individuals who voluntarily go to disability or rehabilitation is given by 
 
( )
( ) ˆ1 ˆ ˆ1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
,ˆ
1 ˆ
θ
θ
 
− ⋅  
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
+ +   
+ − ⋅
= ⋅
+
D
i
i D R
D D R R D RWi i
Gi Wi Gi Wi i Wi Wi iD D R
i i Wi
D D
Wi Wi
D R D
i i i i
iD
i
D
Wi
P
P PP P P P n P P n
P P P
P P
P P P n
P
P
 
where iη  is an error term. Thus, the total probability that the government accepts a worker who 
desires disability becomes  
(A.8) ( )
( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ˆ
θ− ⋅ +⋅ + ⋅
= =  +
+ +   
D RD D R R
i i iGi Wi Gi Wi
Wi D R D
Wi Wi D Ri
Wi WiD
Wi
P PP P P PQ
P P P P P
P
. 
A.2 Calculating the firm probabilities RFiP  and 
D
FiP  in the normal case 
    We can now find DFiP  and 
R
FiP  by inserting the expressions for 
D
GiP  and 
R
GiP  into the disaggregated 
probability equations (A1) and (A2), which can be rewritten as 
(A.9) 
ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1
= ⋅ −
− − − −
D D
D i Wi
Fi D D R D R
Gi Wi Wi Wi Wi
P PP
P P P P P
, 
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(A.10) 
ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1
= ⋅ −
− − − −
R R
R i Wi
Fi R D R D R
Gi Wi Wi Wi Wi
P PP
P P P P P
. 
Now inserting the expression we found for DGiP  in Eq. (A.6) into Eq. (A.9) and rearranging, we get 
 
ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ
−
= ⋅ ⋅
− −
−
R D
D i i Wi
Fi D R R D R
i i Wi Wi Wi
D R
Wi Wi
k P PP
P P P P P
P P
. 
In the same manner we find RFiP  by inserting Eq. (A.7) into Eq. (A.10) to get 
 
ˆ ˆ1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ
D R
R i i Wi
Fi D R D D R
ii i Wi Wi Wi
D R
Wi Wi
k P PP
kP P P P P
P P
−
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
− −
−
. 
Inserting for 
 1 1 0ˆ ˆ1
1 ˆ ˆ
θ
= = >
−
− +
i R D
i i i
R D
Wi Wi
k
P P
P P
 
and 
 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆ1
1 ˆ ˆ
θ
θ
−
−
− = =
−
− +
D R
i i
D R
i Wi Wi
i R D
i i i
R D
Wi Wi
P P
P Pk
P P
P P
 
we get 
(A.11) 
ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ 11 θ
= ⋅ ⋅
−
− −
R D
D i Wi
Fi R D R
iWi Wi Wi
P PP
P P P
 
and 
(A.12) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ1
= ⋅
− −
D R
R i Wi
Fi D D R
Wi Wi Wi
P PP
P P P
. 
It is easily seen that both DFiP  and 
R
FiP  will always be positive as long as ˆ ˆ 1
R R
i WiP P < , ˆ ˆ 1
D D
i WiP P <  and 
ˆ ˆ 1D RWi WiP P+ <  (which by construction is always the case). 
    The sum of the firm probabilities, RFiP , is given by 
(A.13) 
ˆ ˆ1 1ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1
D R
D R R DWi Wi
Fi Fi Fi i iR D D R
iWi Wi Wi Wi
P PP P P P P
P P P Pθ
 
= + = ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅  
−
− − 
, 
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while the aggregate probability that individual i will be pushed out by the conditions at work is given 
by 
 ( )( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ1 ˆ
1 ˆ
⋅ + ⋅
− − + =
+
R D
D Ri i
i iR D
D R D D R R Wi Wi
Wi Wi Gi Fi Gi Fi D
i
D
Wi
P PP P
P PP P P P P P
P
P
. 
Taken together, the total probability that the government accepts a worker who does not desire 
disability becomes 
(A.14) 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ ˆ 1ˆ ˆ1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
D R
R Di i
i iD D R R D R
Gi Fi Gi Fi Wi Wi
Fi D R D D R
R DFi Fi i i i
Wi WiD D R
iWi Wi Wi
P PP P
P P P P P PQ
P P P P PP P
P P P θ
⋅ + ⋅
⋅ + ⋅
= = ⋅
+
+ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
−
 . 
A.3 The non-normal case when ˆ ˆR Ri WiP P>  
    In this case we assume that 1RGiP =  and 1i ik θ= , and our 4 equations are then given by Eqs. (A.1) 
and (A.2) in addition to  
 (A.15) 
ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ θ
= ⋅ ⋅
R R D
Gi i Wi
D D R
Gi ii Wi
P P P
P P P
 
(A.16) 1=RGiP , 
where θi can be greater than 1. We directly find from Eqs. (A.2) and (A.16) that 
(A.17) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
−
=
− −
R R
R i Wi
Fi D R
Wi Wi
P PP
P P
 
and from Eq. (A.15)   
(A.18) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
⋅ − ⋅
= ⋅
⋅
D R D D R
D i i Wi i Wi
Gi D R D
Wi i Wi
P P P P PP
P P P
. 
From this we then find 
(A.19) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
⋅
= ⋅
⋅ − ⋅ − −
D R D
D i Wi Wi
Fi R D D R D R
i Wi i Wi Wi Wi
P P PP
P P P P P P
. 
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A.4 The non-normal case when ˆ ˆD Di WiP P>  
In this case we assume that 1DGiP =  and i ik θ= − , and our 4 equations are then given by Eqs. (A.1) and 
(A.2) in addition to  
 (A.20) ( )ˆ ˆˆ ˆ θ= ⋅ ⋅ −
R R D
Gi i Wi
iD D R
Gi i Wi
P P P
P P P
 
(A.21) 1=DGiP . 
The correction factor -θi  is positive and decreases the probability RGiP  (because 0<-θi  <1). As above in 
section A.3, we easily find the probabilities 
(A.22) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
−
=
− −
D D
D i Wi
Fi D R
Wi Wi
P PP
P P
 
(A.23) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
⋅ − ⋅
= ⋅
⋅
R D R R D
R i i Wi i Wi
Gi R D R
Wi i Wi
P P P P PP
P P P
 
and 
(A.24) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
⋅
= ⋅
⋅ − ⋅ − −
R R D
R i Wi Wi
Fi D R R D D R
i Wi i Wi Wi Wi
P P PP
P P P P P P
. 
A.5 The non-normal case when both ˆ ˆR Ri WiP P>  and ˆ ˆ
D D
i WiP P>  
In this case we have that both 1RGiP =  and 1
D
GiP = , and our 4 equations are then given by Eqs. 
(A.1) and (A.2) in addition  
(A.25) 1=RGiP  
(A.26) 1=DGiP , 
leading to the firm probabilities 
(A.27) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
−
=
− −
D D
D i Wi
Fi D R
Wi Wi
P PP
P P
 
and 
(A.28) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
−
=
− −
R R
R i Wi
Fi D R
Wi Wi
P PP
P P
. 
 
